

# ***BEING ME, BEING YOU: PRONOUN PUZZLES IN MODAL CONTEXTS***<sup>1</sup>

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## **Abstract**

In this paper I investigate the interpretation of pronouns in modal contexts. I focus on dream reports, taking Lakoff's (1972) Brigitte Bardot examples as a starting point. I show that different pronouns behave differently in this context, and propose an analysis that makes use of Percus and Sauerland's (2003) LF proposal, but is restricted to first person pronouns. I also show that to capture the full range of data, we need put restrictions on the counterpart relations available to individuals in a given context.

## **1 Introduction**

As Lakoff's famous (1972) Brigitte Bardot examples show, dream reports allow sequences that would not be possible as matrix clauses:

- (1) I dreamed I was Brigitte Bardot and I kissed me.

They also allow us to make sense of clauses that in extensional contexts would probably be considered irremediably false:

- (2) I dreamed I was you.

As do wishes and counterfactuals:

- (3) I wish I were you.  
(4) If I were you, I would be happier.

An important step in understanding data like this is to understand how pronouns identify individuals across possible worlds. In conceptualizing this, I will adopt David Lewis's view that cross-world identification of entities is done via counterparts. Given a particular individual in a particular world, we can identify the counterpart of that individual (the one who 'counts' as that individual) in other worlds by means of a contextually salient counterpart

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relation.<sup>2</sup> Examples like (4) have been characterized by Lewis (1973) as counterfactuals in which quantification takes place over worlds in which you and I share a counterpart. As expected, since counterpart relations are (mostly) based on similarity, the interpretation can be quite flexible. (4) could be uttered in a context in which I am having a bit of a hard time and imagine what it would be like to have your wonderfully optimistic disposition. Our common counterpart, who would have my current circumstances with your current disposition, would be happy. But we can also imagine (4) uttered in a context in which I am wonderfully optimistic, and you are going through a hard time. Our common counterpart, with my disposition in your circumstances, would be happy.

My investigation in this paper will focus on the contrast between Lakoff's original examples and versions with other pronouns, which do not work as smoothly:

(5) #Lakoff/ he dreamed he was Brigitte Bardot and he kissed him.

The problem here is not simply a mismatch at the level of gender features. We would not report the dream of being Alain Delon and kissing Lakoff using (6):

(6) #He dreamed he was Alain Delon and he kissed him.

And, as (7) shows, a *he* pronoun can be used to access a Brigitte Bardot counterpart:

(7) He dreamed he was Brigitte Bardot and that Alain Delon kissed him.

While it is clear that the issue of gender features needs more investigation, it doesn't seem to be the case that the problem in (5)/(6) is feature mismatch.

The judgments regarding second person pronouns in examples like these seem to pattern with the third person:

(8) #/ ??You dreamed you were Brigitte Bardot and you kissed you.

The patterns in counterfactual examples are similar to those found with dream-reports: there is a contrast between the first person and the other cases:

(9) If I were you, I would kiss me.

(10) #If she were you, she would kiss her.

(11) ?? If you were her, you would kiss you.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> I will work with the hypothesis that counterpart relations are supplied by context (and thus are suitable!), and that they are functions.

<sup>3</sup> The data with second person pronouns is delicate, and needs further investigation. For most people I have consulted, the second person patterns with the third, and the examples are bad. But for some, they are a lot better

In this paper I will address the asymmetry between the first person cases and the others. In §2 I will take a simple modal approach to pronouns as a starting point. In §3 I will show that, left unrestricted, it is insufficient to account for the expanded Lakoff data. I will incorporate into the discussion a version of Percus and Sauerland's (2003) proposal that the LF of (*de se*) dream reports involves specialized binding structures, and Anand's (2006) idea that various paths can lead to *de se* interpretations. In §4 I will sketch some ideas regarding the first person case, and in §5 I will review the case of counterfactuals.

## 2 The simple cases

To understand the asymmetries in §1, we need to understand how actual world individuals are identified in other worlds. I will adopt the view that the information required for cross-world identification is encoded in the pronouns.

### 2.1 The interpretation of pronouns

One of the puzzles in stories about pronouns is how to explain the interaction between their referential impact and the descriptive content that we often associate with them. The descriptive content associated with pronouns is often crucial. Following up on Reinhart (1983), Heim (1998) proposes that pronouns are interpreted as guises (functions from worlds to individuals). The possibility of associating more than one guise with one entity is important in explaining the apparent exceptions to binding theory constraints that we observe in examples like (Reinhart's) (12):

- (12) A: Is the speaker *Zelda*?  
 B: How can you doubt it? She praises her to the sky. No competing candidate would do that.

In (12B), the first pronoun picks out the individual as she presents herself visually and the second picks out the individual as she is known in terms of name, history, etc. As Heim points out, there must be restrictions on when contexts make available more than one guise for a single entity, otherwise, binding theory constraints would be easily circumvented. The suggestion is that (in general) contexts do not make available more than one guise for a single entity (this will be an important part of the my story here).


Following the 'guises' hypothesis, pronouns will be characterized as individual concepts (functions from possible worlds to individuals). As in the more traditional perspective, free variables are interpreted by means of contextually salient variable assignments:

- (13)  $[[\mathbf{he}_i]]^{g,c} = g(\mathbf{i}) = f_i$  (type  $\langle s, e \rangle$ , function from worlds to individuals)

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than the third person. This needs further investigation, and I will concentrate on the first and third person in this paper. See §4 for further examples and contrasts due to Kuno (1987).


We can think of pronouns as encoding the information needed to identify individuals across possible worlds. Context makes salient some description (guise) under which we identify the individual's counterparts across possible worlds:



Much recent work treats features on pronouns as presuppositions. Giving pronouns a modal dimension as has been described above requires making the claim more precise. First and second person features, for example, can be characterized as presuppositions on the actual world referent:

(15)  $[[I_i]]^{g, c} = g(i) = f_i$ , interpretation defined only if  $f_i(w^*) = \text{the speaker in } c \text{ (sp}_c)$

Given that an individual can be identified across worlds under different descriptions, many different pronouns could in principle be associated with one individual. Under the assumption that pronouns encode counterpart relations, this would be a way of saying that one individual may be identified across worlds by means of different counterpart relations:



I will show, however, that in order to explain the full range of Lakoff-examples, it is necessary to take seriously Heim's observation that (in general) only one guise is available per individual in a given context. I will take the position that in any given context, at most one description /counterpart relation will be available to identify an individual in other worlds. This means that there cannot be more than one pronoun associated with an entity in the actual world.<sup>4</sup>

## 2.2 Does this help?

Before tackling Lakoff's examples, let us see what the story so far says about the simple cases (to illustrate, I will set aside for the moment the restriction that context make available only

<sup>4</sup> Sharvit (2004) spells out an account of de re/de se/ de dicto interpretations of pronouns in standard indirect discourse and free indirect discourse. A comparison with the present approach lies beyond the scope of my paper, but is clearly relevant.

one pronoun per entity). I'll characterize *be* as equative, though a predicative approach would not substantially alter what will be said. Given our assumptions so far, *I kiss me* is predicted to be a binding theory violation, and *I am you* is predicted to be obviously false:

$$(17) \quad [[\mathbf{I}_1 \text{ kiss } \mathbf{me}_2]]^{\text{g},c}(w^*) = 1 \text{ iff } [\lambda w. [[\mathbf{I}_1]]^{\text{g},c}(w) \text{ kiss}_w [[\mathbf{me}_2]]^{\text{g},c}(w)](w^*) = 1$$

$$(18) \quad [[\mathbf{I}_1 \text{ am } \mathbf{you}_2]]^{\text{g},c}(w^*) = 1 \text{ iff } [\lambda w. [[\mathbf{I}_1]]^{\text{g},c}(w) = [[\mathbf{you}_2]]^{\text{g},c}(w)](w^*) = 1$$

The simple story so far also takes us some way towards capturing the Lewis-view of counterfactuals like (4).<sup>5</sup> Given (19), we quantify over the most similar worlds in which you and I share a counterpart:

$$(19) \quad [[\text{If } \mathbf{I}_1 \text{ were } \mathbf{you}_2, \mathbf{I}_1 \text{ would resign}]]^{\text{g},c} = 1 \text{ iff}$$

for every world  $w'$  such that  $w'$  is a most-similar-world-to- $w^*$  in which

$$[[\lambda w. [[\mathbf{I}_1]]^{\text{g},c}(w) = [[\mathbf{you}_2]]^{\text{g},c}(w)]] \text{ is true, 'I' resign in } w'.$$

Having used these examples to illustrate the interaction between pronouns and worlds, let us turn now to Lakoff's examples and the need to implement a restriction on the contextually available counterpart relations.

### 3. Pronouns in dream reports

I will start out by discussing Lakoff's original intuition (§3.1), showing its potential shortcomings. I will then present accounts of dream reports by Percus and Sauerland (2003) and Anand (2006) (§3.2), and suggest modifications needed to explain the expanded Lakoff data.

#### 3.1 Lakoff (1972)

In his original discussion, Lakoff noted the importance of counterparts for our understanding of the pronouns in examples like (1). Lakoff's intuition was that we need to allow for two counterparts of the speaker, identified by means of two counterpart relations: an 'individual' counterpart and a 'body' counterpart. Given the story above, this amounts to allowing two different pronouns to be associated with the subject, giving us access to two different counterparts of the speaker in the dream worlds as in the (preliminary) proposal in (20):

$$(20) \quad \textit{I dreamt I was Brigitte Bardot. In my dream, I kissed me.}$$

$$[[(\text{in my dream}) \mathbf{I}_1 \text{ kissed } \mathbf{me}_2]]^{\text{g},w}(w^*) = 1 \text{ iff}$$

$$\forall W_{\text{compatible with the speaker's dreams in } w^*}: [[\mathbf{I}_1]]^{\text{g},c}(w) \text{ kissed}_w [[\mathbf{me}_2]]^{\text{g},c}(w)$$

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<sup>5</sup> But see Guillaume (2006) for a discussion of this view. I will not be able to address the matter here.

Sequences describing dreams could be taken as providing supporting evidence for the view that pronouns in dream reports encode information beyond their function of identifying individuals in the dream worlds. Let us consider an example. Imagine that you live in New York and have a great apartment, I don't. I have the following dream:

(21) I dreamed I was you. I/ ??You lived in New York and had a great apartment.

Given the first sentence, you and I are represented by a single individual in my dream. In the context described above, I can easily refer to that individual with *I*, but it is awkward to do it with *you*. This isn't necessarily the case, however, since facts about you matter. If you didn't live in New York in a great apartment, *you* would be fine:

(22) I dreamt I was you. But you lived in New York and had a great apartment.

One could understand this contrast in terms of informativity. We tell dreams following the same strategies we use when we tell other stories, and don't fill in the details that the audience would be able to fill in on the basis of the facts (Lewis 1978). If you live in New York and have a great apartment, your counterpart in the dream-worlds could be expected to be the same, so it is not informative to use *you*. Given that I don't live in New York, the use of *I* is informative: for a counterpart of mine, living in New York is not expected (21). On the other hand, if you don't live in New York, the fact that your dream-counterpart does is something that is not expected (22). The fact that the different sequences vary in acceptability shows that the way the pronouns anchor the dream-counterpart to the actual world is part of the information provided by the sentence.

Lakoff's solution to the Brigitte Bardot example in (1)/ (20) is to say that multiple counterpart relations are available for the speaker (multiple 'guises'/ pronouns). However, this makes mistaken predictions, since we would expect the same with other pronouns: in examples like (23) and (24) it should be possible to identify the subject as two different individuals in the dream worlds on the basis of two different counterpart relations:

(23) #He dreamt he was Brigitte Bardot and he kissed him.

(24) #You dreamt you were Brigitte Bardot, and you kissed you.

I take it that examples like (23) and (24) show that (in general) context does not provide more than one guise (counterpart relation) for one entity, and so it is not possible to identify one individual with two others in another world. Basically, this is further corroboration of Heim's observation that the availability of guises must be restricted. However, if we make this move, we need to provide an alternative account of Lakoff's original examples. I will get to this in the next two sections, starting out by discussing the theories about dream-reports put forward in Percus and Sauerland (2003) (P&S) and Anand (2006).

### 3.2 Getting to *de se*: Percus and Sauerland (2003), Anand (2006)

The proposals made by P&S (2003) and Anand (2006) will provide the background needed to explain the data discussed above.<sup>6</sup> From these proposals I will take two main points: (i) from P&S I will take the idea that *de se* interpretations can arise by means of a specialized LF that results from the movement of a pronoun acting as a binder. However, I will restrict their proposal, and make the binding LF available only for first person pronouns. (ii) from Anand I will take the idea that *de se* interpretations can arise through a variety of strategies. I am interested in two of the options: *de se* interpretations arising through specialized binding LFs (as those generated by P&S), and *de se* interpretations arising as a special case of *de re* readings in which the property used to identify the counterparts of an individual across worlds is that they be entities the individual identifies with (following Lewis (1979)). However, (following Heim's observations) Anand's proposal will be considered as part of a system in which context makes available at most one counterpart relation ('guise') per individual.

Percus and Sauerland motivate their proposal for specialized *de se* binding LFs by pointing out asymmetries in the interpretations of dream reports. Imagine that John has been dreaming that he is Bill and that he got married. The example in (25) can only be interpreted as in (a)-(c), and cannot receive the interpretation described in (d):

- (25) John dreamed he married his grand-daughter
- a. In his dream, the dream-self marries the dream-self's grand-daughter
  - b. In his dream, the dream-self marries John's grand-daughter
  - c. In his dream, John marries John's grand-daughter
  - d. #In his dream, John marries the dream-self's grand-daughter

P&S observe that there isn't a general requirement that the first instance of the relevant pronoun be interpreted *de se*, it is the relative positions of the pronouns that matters:

- (26) John dreamed that his<sub>John</sub> grand-daughter married him<sub>self</sub>.

The sentence in (26) can receive the interpretation annotated above, according to which John dreamed that John's grand-daughter married the individual who was himself in the dream.

P&S derive the facts in (25) by proposing that the *de se* reading is obtained by movement of a special pronoun (pro\*) that gives rise to an operator-binder configuration (the features on the pronoun agree with the subject). *De se dream* combines with a property denotation obtained by moving the pro\*, and in a simple case, things look as in (27):

- (27) John dreamed that the avalanche hit him.  
 him\* [ $\lambda_1$  [the avalanche hit  $t_1$ ]] (pronoun\* = 'abstractor')

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<sup>6</sup> I limit my discussion to P&S and Anand because of their focus on dream reports. Moulton (2005) presents a different proposal regarding the paths leading to *de se* (with ECM data), and Maier (2004) proposes a reductionist account.

P&S characterize dream as believe-while-asleep, and (27) would be true if John self-ascribed the property  $\lambda x. \textit{the avalanche hit } x$ .

A binding analysis allows P&S to explain the difference between (25) and (26) in terms of constraints on binding and possible interveners. In order to generate the (b) reading for (25), indexing and movement take place as in (28), which is permitted:

(28) John [ $\lambda^c_1 \dots t^c_1 \dots$  dreamt that [his\* [ $\lambda_2 \dots t_2$  was marrying his<sub>1</sub> grand-daughter]]]

To generate the (d) reading, however, movement and binding would have to take place as in (29):

(29) #John [ $\lambda^c_1 \dots t^c_1 \dots$  dreamt that [his\* [ $\lambda_2 \dots$  he<sub>1</sub> was marrying  $t_2$  grand-daughter]]]

According to P&S, the configuration in (29) is ruled out by a constraint on movement: in order to arrive at this structure, the pro\* would have to move across another pronoun that c-commands it and shares the same features, and this is ruled out by superiority.<sup>7</sup>

My interest in P&S's proposal lies in the fact that it sets up a system to generate de se interpretations by binding of special pronouns and I will make use of this idea in the next section. As Anand (2006) discussed, the P&S system could be used to explain the Lakoff examples as de se binding. The P&S analysis correctly predict that we interpret the sentences as reporting a dream in which the dream self kissed Lakoff (the interpretation according to which Lakoff kissed the dream self would violate superiority):

(30) I dreamed I kissed me.  
 [I\* [ $\lambda_1 t_1$  kissed me]] / # [me\* [ $\lambda_1 I$  kissed  $t_1$ ]]

However, in P&S's analysis there are no restrictions blocking binding LFs like this one with other pronouns, and so the pronoun asymmetry in Lakoff-type examples is unexplained. I will make use of P&S's specialized binding LFs to explain Lakoff's examples, but I will restrict the availability of such binding structures to the first person pronoun. My idea is that the first person case is special, and differs from the others precisely in allowing special binding LFs for de se interpretations. Having made this move, however, an alternative account needs to be given to P&S's original data in (25), and I will turn to this after presenting some of the views developed in Anand (2006).

Anand (2006) coincides with P&S in that de se dream reports have specialized binding LFs. However, he considers that other mechanisms are also needed to derive de se interpretations. Following Lewis (1979), he defends the possibility of arriving at de se interpretations via a special way of understanding *de re*: *de se* can be a special case of *de re* in which an individual is identified across worlds in terms of his/her de se counterparts (a SELF description). In a de se interpretation ('guise') for a third person pronoun, for example, the pronoun would pick out

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<sup>7</sup> Anand (2006) offers an alternative account of the binding issues in dream scenarios, with an alternative interpretation of P&S's basic analysis. The differences are not relevant here, so I will only present P&S's proposal.



an individual in the actual world, and in other worlds would pick out the individuals the actual world individual identifies with.

Part of Anand's motivation for allowing a variety of mechanisms to result in *de se* interpretations comes from the observation that not all propositional attitude verbs give rise to the blocking effects observed by P&S in dream reports. Anand provides an example with *believe*. He presents us with a scenario in which John, an amnesiac who happens to be a Picasso scholar, comes across a half-finished copy of a Picasso painting and believes he is Picasso. He also reads about a famous Picasso scholar (himself) who is claimed to own five Picassos. In these circumstances, we could report John's beliefs with (31):

- (31) John believed that he was Picasso and that he<sub>John</sub> owned five of his<sub>self</sub> paintings.  
(Anand 2006)

Anand explains the difference between (31) and (25) (where the configuration leading to this interpretation is disallowed) by arguing that the relevant reading in (31) is not generated by means of *pro\** movement (as in (25)), but by means of a SELF interpretation for the possessive pronoun (given that the *de se* interpretation is generated without movement, no superiority effects are predicted).<sup>8</sup>

My proposal is that first person differs from the others in that a binding LF is available for *de se* binding by a first person, but not available for the other pronouns. If the binding option is not available for third person pronouns, and only one guise is available per entity (that is, at most one description is available to identify individuals in other worlds), then examples like (32)/ (33) are straightforwardly predicted to be unacceptable:

- (32) In his dream, he<sub>1</sub> kissed him<sub>1</sub>.  
(33) If she were you, she<sub>2</sub> would kiss her<sub>2</sub>.

I have used coindexation in (32) and (33) to note that the same pronoun (the same guise) is found in both cases, and so it won't be possible for the pronouns to pick different individuals in the worlds quantified over. Only a reflexive interpretation will be available, and for that interpretation, a reflexive pronoun should have been used.

If a binding LF is not available for third person pronouns, and at most one guise is available for each entity, how are we to explain P&S's original examples? Consider (34)

- (34) In John's dream, his<sub>John</sub> daughter married him<sub>self</sub>


Without a binding LF, how are we to obtain the *de se* interpretation according to which John's daughter married the dream's self (the interpretation is annotated above)? Imagine that we are dealing with a single guise and that the relation used to identify John's counterparts in other worlds is the SELF relation:

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<sup>8</sup> I will not discuss this example here, but it merits further attention. Anand considers (and discards) the possibility that *he* here is actually an E-type pronoun.

- (35)  $[[\mathbf{he}_1]] = g(i) = f_{\text{John's-self}}$   
 (for all possible worlds  $w$ ,  $f_{\text{John's-self}}(w) =$  the individual John identifies with in  $w$ )

If the pronoun *him* in (34) is interpreted as in (35), it will pick out John's self counterparts in the dream worlds, and the dream description can be understood as a *de se* dream about somebody marrying the dream-self. To explain why we do not necessarily understand the sentence to report that the dream-self's daughter married the dream-self, we have to allow the definite DP *his daughter* to be interpreted *outside* the scope of the dream description. That is, we have to allow the sentence in (34) to be understood as being *de re* regarding John's daughter, and claiming that in the dream, the counterpart of the real-world John's daughter married the dream-self. To make this more explicit, I will switch to a representation in which world pronouns are syntactically represented, as in (36):



Given the distribution of world-pronouns in (36), the definite DP *his daughter* is given what is usually called a 'wide scope' interpretation (this interpretation is sometimes called 'transparent'). The dream description in (36) will be true in worlds in which the counterpart of the actual daughter of John (picked out by *his<sub>1</sub>* in the actual world  $w^*$ ) marries the dream-self (picked out by *him<sub>1</sub>* in the dream worlds). I have included  $f_w$  in the syntactic representation as a free variable ranging over functions that take a world and an entity and deliver the counterpart of that entity in the input world. It is very plausible to say that the counterpart of actual world John's daughter in the dream worlds will be a woman who is the daughter of somebody very much like John in the dream worlds (like John in origins, appearance, etc.). The claim, therefore, is that the interpretation in (34)/(36) is a *de re* interpretation regarding the daughter, and that we end up imagining her father is somebody like John simply because we are looking for somebody who is similar to her. Conceptualizing this reading as *de re* with respect to the daughter predicts that it should be possible to use (34) to report a dream by John in cases in which in his dream he does not know that she is John's daughter. While it is true that the examples get rather complicated, it is possible to construct a relevant scenario:

- (37) John is suffering from amnesia. His family is offering all the support they can and they have taken him in as a 'guest' at their house, in the hope that their proximity will jog his memory. Last night he had dinner with his wife and grown-up children, and sat next to his daughter (whom he does not recognize as such). That night he dreamed that

the young woman who sat next to him at the table married him, and he tells me about it. I can see the implications of this, and proceed to inform you:

- (i) In his dream, his daughter married him.

Given that a ‘wide scope’ interpretation is predicted to be available both in subject and object positions, the relevant interpretations for P&S’s (25) and (26) are predicted.

To finish this section, let us consider now the possibility that a ‘wide scope’ interpretation be available for one of the pronouns in examples like:

- (38) #In his dream, he kissed him.

We have explained the anomaly of examples like (38) by claiming that a single ‘guise’ is available for the individual. Our explanation made use of the assumption that both pronouns were evaluated in the same (dream) worlds. But in explaining (34), we have set aside this assumption. So what prevents us from saying that in examples like (38), one of the pronouns is evaluated with respect to  $w^*$  (i.e. it is interpreted with ‘wide scope’)? I don’t think this possibility is problematic. We can indeed say that one of the pronouns is evaluated with respect to the actual world. But then we will have to find the counterpart of the actual world dreamer in the dream-worlds. And since we are working with the assumption that context only provides one description for any given entity, the counterpart relation that would be contextually salient for the actual world denotation of *he* would be the same as the one underlying the pronoun, so it won’t help. The counterpart of the actual world denotation of *he* in the dream worlds would simply be the denotation of *he* in the dream worlds, and we would still arrive at a reflexive interpretation.

#### **4. Proposal: a ‘speaker oriented’ perspectival centre and first-person *de se* binding**

##### **4.1 Preliminaries**

Our initial observation in §1 was that first person pronouns behave differently than the others. The observation that the first person/ author plays a special role is found in various forms in the literature. Following Cinque (1999), for example, Speas (2004) has recently suggested that the speaker is the subject of a speech-act functional projection corresponding to the highest functional projection in the clause. Anand and Sieh (2005) follow up on a similar idea, and propose that a point-of-view head makes reference to the author of an utterance:

- (39) "We will pursue the idea that the indexically-dependent interpretation of the affectee variables are due to covert syntactic binding by a referentially denoting element: the perspectival centre. Following Tenny and Speas (2003) we will assume that the P-head is a point of view head high in the left-periphery that referentially denotes the psychological perspective from which the sentence is situated." Anand & Sieh (2005).

The special status of the speaker (and maybe addressee) with respect to binding options had already been noted by Kuno (1987), who collected the examples below (examples like these have also been discussed by Reinhart and Reuland (1993)):<sup>9</sup>

- (40) a. As for myself, I won't be invited.  
 b. ??As for yourself, you won't be invited.  
 c. \*As for herself, she won't be invited.
- (41) a. Physicists like myself were never too happy with the parity principle.  
 b. Physicists like yourself are a godsend.  
 c. \*Physicists like himself don't often make mistakes.

To spell this out concretely, I propose that it is possible to generate LFs in which a referential expression denoting the speaker in the utterance context combines with a clause in which a self-ascription predicate has a property as a sister.

- (42) [ **ME** [ **self-ascribe** I\* [ $\lambda i$  .....i .....]]]

**Self-ascribe** denotes a function from properties to entities that holds in case the entity self-ascribes the property, and the silent *ME* refers to the speaker / author in the context of utterance:

- (43) [[**ME**]]<sup>s, c</sup> = the speaker in c (sp<sub>c</sub>)

The property sister to *self-ascribe* is generated by means of movement of a special pronoun (as in P&S's proposal). While the self-ascription structure is phonologically silent, the pronoun (pro\*) surfaces with first person features due to agreement with the silent first person *ME*.

#### 4.2 Proposal for LFs of *de se* dreaming

P&S derive *de se* dreaming from a structure in which a property complement is obtained by abstracting over a pronoun (pro\*). I will retain this approach for the first person case, and a simple dream report (44) will be given an LF like in (45):

- (44) I dreamed I kissed me.  
 (45) I<sub>2</sub> dreamed I\* [ $\lambda_1$  t<sub>1</sub> kissed me<sub>2</sub>]

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<sup>9</sup> I am very grateful to Orin Percus for pointing out these examples to me.

In (45) the first person ‘binder’ has generated a specialized *de se* LF, which is the complement of (*de se*) dream.

P&S characterize *dream* as *believe while asleep*, and I will characterize *de se dreaming* as *de se believing while asleep*. (44) will be true in the circumstances described below:

- (46)  $\forall w'$ :  $w'$  is compatible with the dreams of  $[[\mathbf{I}_2]]^{g,c}(w^*)$ .  
 self-ascribe-in-sleep  $(\lambda x. x \text{ kissed } [[\mathbf{me}_2]]^{g,c}(w')) \text{ } [[\mathbf{I}_2]]^{g,c}(w^*)$

According to (46), I can truthfully assert that I dreamed I kissed me (in a context in which I am dreaming that I am Brigitte Bardot), if for each of the entities that are my counterpart under the contextually salient description (e.g. people who look like me, have my history, etc.), in my sleep I self-ascribe the property of having kissed that entity. Since, as far as context is concerned, they are ‘the same’ entity, this does not seem to be an unwelcome result

In examples like (47), I propose that there is a silent self-ascription structure, and that the frame adverbial (*in my dream*) modifies the self-ascription predicate:

- (47) In my dream, I kissed me.  
 (48)  $[[ \text{(in my dream) ME self-ascribe I}^* [\lambda_1 t_1 \text{ kissed me}_2] ] ]^{g,c}(w^*) = 1$  iff  
 $\forall w'$ :  $w'$  is compatible with the dreams of  $sp_c$ .  
 self-ascribe-in-sleep  $(\lambda x. x \text{ kissed } [[\mathbf{me}_2]]^{g,c}(w')) \text{ } (sp_c)$

The proposal for (47) is like that for (44). If context makes available a counterpart relation under which we identify me in other worlds by looking at individuals who are similar in terms of appearance, history, etc., (47) claims that in my sleep I self-ascribe the property of kissing such an individual.

I will leave the compositional spell-out of the role of the frame adverbial in (47) for the future. The kinds of interpretations that we find in the scope of frame-adverbials like *in my dream* can also be found with other adverbials, that do not seem tied to propositional attitudes: *in the play*, *in the movie*, etc.:

- (49) In the movie, I am Brigitte Bardot.

The kinds of binding configurations that we observed in the Lakoff examples can also be reproduced in these cases. Imagine that a movie is being made about my life, but I do not get to play the main character, and instead get demoted to the role of my mother-in-law:

- (50) In the movie, I treat me very badly.

The sentence in (50) can be used to report that in the movie, I (as my mother in law) treat the character who is me badly. It cannot be used to report that the character who is me in the movie treats me (as my mother in law) badly.<sup>10</sup>

## 5. Counterfactual claims about identity

Through the analysis of dream reports above, I have presented data supporting the view that context only makes available one guise to identify an entity in other worlds. This hypothesis, together with the idea that first person pronouns are different from others in allowing the generation of specialized *de se* binding LFs has explained the asymmetry we observed between different pronouns in Lakoff-style examples. In this last section, I would like to return to the data from counterfactuals, to qualify what it is that I mean when I claim that context makes available one guise per entity.

There are different ways of thinking about the information encoded by the context parameter and the conditions of context change. In context-change semantics, the characterization of the context change potential of complex expressions makes use of the context change potential of subordinate clauses. To calculate the context change potential of a conditional, for example, it is necessary to first update an initial context with the antecedent, arriving at a derived context which will then be updated with the consequent. Heim (1992) proposes the following context change potential for counterfactual conditionals (I am setting aside the issue of presupposition in the antecedent):

(51)  $c + \text{if } \phi \text{ would } \psi = \{w \in c: \text{Sim}_w(W + \phi) + \psi = \text{same}\}$  (Heim (1992))

The context in which the antecedent is evaluated is thus different from the context in which the consequent is evaluated. If the restriction that (in general!) context provides at most one guise per entity applies to context at this level, we would expect that antecedents and consequents of conditionals should make available different guises for the same entity (even though, with any one context, only one guise per entity would be possible). This prediction is borne out, as some examples indicate that it is possible to change guise ‘half way through’ a conditional:

(52) If she were me, she would kiss me (because I have a tendency to kiss everybody)

The antecedent and consequent in examples such as (52) seem to provide two different ways to access me in other worlds: the antecedent sets up a counterpart relation that allows her to be me, and the consequent sets up a (different) counterpart relation that allows her to kiss me.

Note, however, that within the consequent, two guises are not available for the same entity:

(53) #If she were me, she would kiss her (because I find her very attractive)

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<sup>10</sup> Katz (1995) proposes an analysis of how such frame adverbials shift the temporal perspective of sentences, and their aspectual properties. It does take into account other indexicals.

As expected, the first person case is special, and allows for options not available to the other pronouns:

(54) If I were you/ her, I would kiss me.

## 6. Conclusion

This paper presents some steps towards an analysis of the interpretation of pronouns in modal contexts. I have adopted a rather simple view of pronouns, considering them as guises, and I have shown that various consequences can be derived from the view that context makes available one guise per entity. I have also proposed that the first person pronoun case is different, and suggested that a phonologically silent ‘self ascription’ structure may be available for the first person, together with a specialized *de se* binding LF. The differences in the options available for *de se* for first person vs. the others would explain the asymmetries we observe in the interpretations of pronouns in modal contexts. While I have been able to be precise in some areas, part of the work is left for future research. Notably, the interpretation of counterfactuals.

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